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Appointments, Pay and Performance in
UK boardrooms by Gender
Ian Gregory-Smith∗, Brian G. M. Main and Charles A. O’Reilly III.
For the attention of the typesetter: Appointments, Pay, Performance and Gender
This paper uses UK data to examine issues regarding the scarcity of women in
boardroom positions. The paper examines appointments, pay and any associated
productivity effects deriving from increased diversity. Evidence of gender-bias
in the appointment of women as non-executive directors is found together with
mixed evidence of discrimination in wages or fees paid. However, the paper finds
no support for the argument that gender diverse boards enhance corporate per-
formance. Proposals in favour of greater board diversity may be best structured
around the moral value of diversity, rather than with reference to an expectation
of improved company performance.
JEL codes: J31; J62; J63
There are longstanding concerns over the equality of treatment of women in the labour
market. Findings that women are underpaid or unduly overlooked for promotion offend
a sense of moral justice and many countries regard such practice as unlawful. In addi-
tion, discrimination in the labour market constrains economic efficiency (Becker, 1957).
An area that remains a high profile concern is diversity in the boardroom. Historically,
very low numbers of female directors have suggested shortcomings in the market for
board level appointments. Yet it is board directors who potentially have the greatest
marginal impact on firm value and, in aggregate, GDP. Moreover, a lack of diversity
at the top could result in narrow decision making and frustrate equality elsewhere in
the company hierarchy. Whilst the trend amongst FTSE350 companies in Table 1 is
towards greater gender diversity, some have predicted it might take another 70 years to
achieve gender parity in the boardroom (E&HRC, 2007). In the UK, claiming that the
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business case for increased female representation on boards is clear, the Department
for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) has set an aspirational target of 25% to be
attained in FTSE100 companies by 2015 (Davies, 2011). More recently the EU has pro-
posed a 40% target for female representation on the boards of all listed companies by
2020 (European Union, 2012). In 2003, Norway set a similar, initially voluntary, target
of 40% to be attained by 2005. Only by later making compliance mandatory (Storvik
and Teigen, 2010; Nielsen and Huse, 2010) was this figure finally attained (in 2008).
Some countries such as France, Finland, Iceland, Italy, and Spain have embarked upon
similar policy journeys (Davies, 2011), with others, such as Australia, Austria, and The
Netherlands, adopting a less directive approach.
Current arguments in favour of mandatory quotas for female directors (Terjesen et al.,
2009), as adopted by Norwegian regulators, are generally based on considerations of
equity but are often also located around an expectation of improved corporate perfor-
mance (Adams et al., 2007). This improvement can occur through two channels. First,
high quality female directors, previously excluded from the executive labour market
could replace less able male directors. Second, a more diverse team may improve board
decision making. This raises two questions. First, just how inequitable is the experience
of women board members? Second, what performance link can be observed between
female representation at boardroom level and company performance?
The majority of work in this area has been conducted using data from the USA. There
is a very different institutional context in the UK, with a comply-or-explain system
of corporate governance (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; Hampel, 1998; FRC, 2012),
director elections that avoid staggered boards (Bebchuk et al., 2002), and a general
aversion to dual class shareholding (Mayer, 2013). This produces a more robust market
for corporate control (Mayer, 2013) than found in the USA and elsewhere. As explained
above, the representation and treatment of women on boards is a highly salient policy
issue both in the UK (Davies, 2011) and in the rest of Europe (European Union, 2012).
Using data on the board composition and the company performance of UK listed com-
panies between 1996 and 2011, this paper searches for evidence that sheds light on these
two issues, equity and productivity. In terms of equity, the board appointment process
is examined for evidence of gender bias and the remuneration of directors is tested for
a significant male-female wage gap. In terms of the productivity effects of diversity,
key measures of company performance are tested for a link with board gender diversity.
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Evidence is found of gender bias in the appointment of women as non-executive direc-
tors, although no effect is found in the case of executive directors. The data also reveal
an unexplained underpayment of female non-executives relative to their male counter-
parts. Again, no such disparity in treatment is found for executive directors. Finally,
the extent of gender diversity of boards could not be associated with any significant
difference in company performance - even when examined over a wide range of perfor-
mance measures. The article is structured as follows. Section 1. reviews the literature
relating to the presence of women on company boards. Section 2. introduces the data
sources utilised and discusses the estimation methods deployed. Section 3. presents the
results, and the paper concludes with a policy discussion in section 4..
1. Women on company boards
1.1. The appointment of women to company boards
The fact that the representation of women on company boards is far lower than their
presence in the labour market would suggest is not necessarily proof of discrimination.
The outcome may be due to supply-side effects arising from considerations such as
family formation (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Bygren and Ghler, 2012). According to
this view, the decisions of women in terms of their choice of labour market activity,
human capital investment and consequent career path result in a relatively limited pool
of qualified female candidates when board positions are filled. This contrasts with the
notion of the ‘glass ceiling’ (Powell and Butterfield, 1994) which argues that there are
discriminatory barriers that inhibit the progression of women up the corporate ladder.
Both perspectives suggest that, when board appointments are made, qualified applicants
are predominantly male.
Empirical testing for discriminatory effects in hiring at this level of the corporate ladder
lacks comprehensive measures of the availability of suitably qualified candidates for any
given position. That all job applications are not publicly observed, only accepted offers,
makes testing the hiring process for discriminatory effects difficult. Even studies that
deploy exceptionally rich data sets have their conclusions regarding the operation of
a ‘glass ceiling’ undermined by lingering concerns regarding unobserved heterogeneity
(Smith et al., 2010). The work of Farrell and Hersch (2005) points to a test of discrim-
ination in the appointment process that can be implemented by comparing the gender
of a new appointment to a board with that of any immediate predecessor incumbent
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who has just stood down.
In a gender neutral world, the next appointment to the board should simply be the best
candidate for that position. If 10% of the qualified candidates in the labour market are
women then there should be a 10% chance that any appointment is female. If the
proportion is 20% then the probability should be 20%. That probability may be low
owing to supply-side or ‘pipeline’ effects (Doldor et al., 2012), but it should be the
same whether a male or female director is leaving the board. What should not occur,
however, is that the gender of the appointee should somehow depend on the gender
of the departing director, as that is then not a gender neutral process but points to
discrimination. The Farrell and Hersch (2005) test examines whether the probability
that a newly appointed director is female is independent of the gender of any director
who is stepping down from the board.
Farrell and Hersch (2005) establish that the chances of appointing a female are signifi-
cantly higher if a woman has recently demitted the board. They study a sample of some
300 Fortune 500 level firms over the 10-year period that comprised the 1990s, and esti-
mate that the probability of making a female appointment in any year is around 0.39 if
a female has recently departed but only 0.13 if a male has departed. The observed effect
may be due to ‘tokenism’ (Kanter, 1997; Elstad and Ladegard, 2012) but it certainly
qualifies as discriminatory, and in terms of the attainment an aspirational target such
as a 25% female representation on FTSE100 by 2015 (Davies, 2011), it would suggest
that there is more to overcome than simple demographic inertia (Marschke et al., 2007).
It is this test of discrimination that we utilise here.
1.2. The payment of women on company boards
A second area of potential discrimination is in the payment made to female directors -
either as executive directors or as non-executive directors. For the latter, remuneration
comprises fees paid for being in office and for attending various board meetings and
board sub-committee meetings. For executive directors, remuneration is generally of
a much higher level and comprises both cash-based and equity-linked pay, as will be
detailed below. Using a very large sample of all employees in Sweden in 1998, Albrecht
et al. (2003) establish a significant glass ceiling effect at the top of the wage distribu-
tion and demonstrate that a similar effect exists for the USA, albeit empirically more
modest. They also argue that while three-quarters of the observed male-female wage
gap at the top of the wage distribution can be explained by personal and occupational
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characteristics, these, and particularly the observed occupation, are simply manifesta-
tions of the same glass-ceiling effect. One reason to doubt whether such findings can be
replicated in boardroom appointments is the extensive use of remuneration consultants
in setting directors’ pay and the high degree of transparency that attends the award of
directors’ pay (Main et al., 2008).
Research on the male-female director wage gap has focussed on the executive group.
Using data for the USA on the five highest paid executives in each of a sample of
companies from 1992 through 1997, Hallock and Bertrand (2001) find a raw gender pay
gap of some 45% (where pay includes the value of executive share options issued in
the year). They find that all but five percentage points of this gap can be explained
by company characteristics (size and performance) and by individual characteristics
(age, job-tenure, and CEO status). Adams et al. (2007) extend the period of analysis
through 2004 and fail to find any significant gender difference in the pay of CEOs
(measured as base pay plus annual bonus), although for other boardroom executives a
statistically significant gap of some 17% remains. Pau and Sahni (2009) study the period
1994 through 2002 and ascribe much of the observed gender difference in remuneration
(defined to include equity related awards) as being due to the riskiness of the industry
entered. But they continue to find a statistically significant five percentage point gender
gap in pay.
In fact, the evidence here is mixed. Smith et al. (2010) find that, in a sample of Danish
companies, while controlling for personal and occupational characteristics reduces the
male-female gap, it remains both empirically and statistically significant. Adams and
Ferreira (2009), on the other hand, find that for companies in the USA between 1996
and 2003 there was no statistically significant gender difference in executive director pay.
The lack of significance remains even when the focus is on individual CEO pay. The
existence of a statistically significant gender wage gap among directors of UK companies
will be tested below, with separate analyses for executive directors and non-executive
directors. The latter are paid primarily by fee and, as has been indicated above, at
what is generally a much lower level of reward.
1.3. Women on company boards and company performance
As indicated above, there is an equity-based case for appointing a greater proportion
of women to serve on company boards. There are also, however, two further arguments
that are based on considerations of productivity. The first concerns the direct costs
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of discrimination and the second relates to the improvement to decision making, and
hence productivity, that arises from working in diverse teams.
In terms of the first argument, any companies indulging in discrimination in this area
(Becker, 1957) will fail to realise the full productive potential of women and hence place
themselves at a competitive disadvantage. Appealing to self interest, ‘not the best but
the strongest motive in humanity’ (Marshall, 1927), locates the argument for reducing
discrimination in terms of productivity, rather than its moral quality. Yet self interest
alone has been questioned in light of persistent discrimination in the labour market. For
example, Arrow (1972) compares the profit motive’s apparent impotence in eliminating
discrimination to Sherlock Holmes’ ‘dog that did not bark in the night’ (Doyle, 1892).
The Arrow-Marshall critique has been partly answered by models of human capital
acquisition (Mincer and Polachek, 1974), statistical discrimination in job allocation
(Lazear and Rosen, 1990), dynamic monopsony (Manning, 2003; Ransom and Oaxaca,
2010) whereby employers exploit the different supply elasticities of males and females,
and by more psychological and sociological models (Booth, 2009) where employers’ and
employees’ perspectives impact on labour market outcomes. In this last context, where
individual negotiation is expected to be relatively important, the observed difference in
negotiating styles between men and women, as captured in the Babcock and Laschever
(2003) phrase ‘women don’t ask’ could contribute to any observed pay disparity, as
Blackaby et al. (2005) find among UK academics.
The second productivity-based argument in favour of appointing women to boards cen-
tres on the observation that diverse teams achieve better results than more homoge-
neous ones (Milliken and Martins, 1996; Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Goodstein et al., 1994).
Translated to board composition, this leads to the ‘business case for diversity’ (Robin-
son and Dechant, 1997; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003), which argues that the addition
of women to boards brings with it an uplift in productivity. Empirically, there is evi-
dence to suggest that in general the precise composition of the board has little empirical
impact on company performance (Larcker et al., 2007) but, compared to men, women
do seem to make different contributions in terms of board activity (Adams and Ferreira,
2009; Huang and Kisgen, 2012; Levi et al., 2011; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Zelechowski
and Bilimoria, 2004). The evidence on whether this translates to a significant impact
on company performance is less clear (O’Reilly and Main, 2012).
There are studies that point to consistent productivity effects (Joy et al., 2007; McK-
insey & Co., 2007, 2008, 2010; Rohner and Dougan, 2012; Wilson and Altanlar, 2009),
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but others fail to find any significant effect (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Using as a nat-
ural experiment the imposition of a quota of 40% boardroom representation imposed
on publicly quoted Norwegian companies, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) actually find a
negative impact on firm valuations, suggesting negative expected performance implica-
tions of the change. There are short run costs of being forced to hire in order to meet
a quota. With an exclusive pool of female candidates to draw from, the Norwegian
firms may be have been forced to pay over the odds for talent or hire underqualified
directors. Only over a longer period of time, with an increase in the supply of suitably
qualified candidates, would the benefits from diverse decision making be fully realised.
Moreover, Gregory et al. (2012) provide evidence against using market reaction as a test
of expected performance, as the market itself may be biased against female directors
over a short performance window, only correcting itself after more information on ac-
tual performance is revealed. Other studies find a positive effect by focusing on indirect
measures of performance such as innovation (Torchia et al., 2011), with some going on
to link such innovation to higher company performance (Miller and del Carmen Triana,
2009; Dezso and Gaddis Ross, 2012). The measures of performance used are invariably
accounting based such as return of assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), or Tobin’s Q
(Erhardt et al., 2003). And finding a positive connection between women on the board
and firm performance often depends on the specific metric chosen for performance (Er-
hardt et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2006). In the analysis below, both a market based
measure of performance (shareholder return) and a range of accounting based measures
are used to test the hypothesis that there is a link in the UK between the prevalence of
women on a board and that company’s performance.
2. Data and Methods
The data used here are obtained from a proprietary source created by Manifest Infor-
mation Services for the purpose of providing proxy voting advice.2 The data span 1996
through 2011 and cover all companies that have been listed on the FTSE350 during that
period. Even when a company falls out of the index, it continues to be followed. The
data provide a particularly rich picture of the comings and goings in the boardroom.
The start and end date of each director’s period of office is recorded, as is a variety of
2Stata files enabling the replication of results are available at
http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/working papers.htm. To access the data used in the
analysis, please contact the authors. Note, data access requires possession of the appropriate licence
from Manifest.
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information describing the personal characteristics and the financial reward received in
each year by all directors - whether executive or non-executive. Additional information
concerning company performance in each year is obtained from DataStream.
2.1. Measures
A comprehensive measure of pay is obtained by adding not only cash payments such
as base pay, board fees and annual bonus payments but also the value of long-term
incentive arrangements such as executive share options and performance share plans
(Pepper, 2006). The single source of reward that is not captured arises from pensions.
This is because data on pensions are simply not available in a consistent or continuous
form. That said, the pay measures used are as comprehensive as possible. Three pay
measures are calculated. The narrowest is the cash-based short term measure of salary
plus annual cash bonus paid out (plus any other cash payments or cash equivalents
paid in the year, such as re-location allowances and the cash value of perquisites).
This is labelled total cash compensation (TCC). A wider measure that adds to ‘TCC’
an approximation of the value of awarded share options, performance share plans and
other long-term incentives is total direct compensation awarded (TDCa). In this, we
approximate the actuarial value of executive share options by one-third of awarded
face value and of performance share plans by 70% of awarded share value.3 Owing to
the growing complexity of such arrangements due to the increasing conditionality of
these equity-linked rewards that are often dependent on the attainment of complex and
idiosyncratic relative performance conditions (Main, 2006), no measure of the value
awarded is going to be anything but an approximate estimate. For this reason, the
third measure has much to commend it. This is total direct compensation as realised
(TDCr) which adds to ‘TCC’ the observed realised value of long term incentives such
as executive share options and performance share plans. This obviates the need to
estimate the expected value of awarded incentives, and simply records their actual
value at vesting when they can be cashed in (Gregory-Smith and Main, 2013).
Owing to the richness of the data, it is possible to characterise a company’s board at
the end of each financial year by the percentage of directors who are female (p female),
the percentage who are non-executive (p neds), the percentage who are adjudged by the
3The use of 30% of face value as an estimate of the actuarial value of share options follows the
practice of the remuneration consultancy industry (MM & K Ltd, 2007). Checks performed in Gregory-
Smith (2012) demonstrate that the approach is robust. Conyon and Murphy (2000) valued performance
share plans at 80% of face value.
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proxy advisory firm to be truly independent (p ind), and the total board size (Board).
The size of the company is measured by the logarithm of that year’s turnover (LnSize)
as recorded in DataStream. Company performance is also gauged on an annual ba-
sis using: total shareholder return (TSR); return on assets (ROA); return on equity
(ROE); and the logarithm of the price-to-book ratio (LnPTOB), used here to approxi-
mate Tobin’s Q. Share price volatility (V olatility) is measured over the prior 12-month
period. Director pay and company descriptors are all winsorised at the 1% and 99%
tails. All financial data are expressed in £2010.
Apart from gender (Female), additional personal detail on individual directors is avail-
able in the form of age in years (Age), age-squared (Age2), and the number of years
to date on the board (Tenure). It is also possible to categorise the position held on
the board into Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chair (Chair), or Financial Director
(FD). For non-executive directors, particular attention is paid to service on the re-
muneration committee, whether simply as a member (RemCo Member) or as Chair
(RemCo Chair). In the analysis of the new board member appointment decision, use
is also made of the descriptor as to whether in the prior period any male director
had exited the board (MExit) or whether any female director had exited the board
(FExit). These measures are also available separately for executive directors and for
non-executive directors.
Table 1 provides a summary of the data in terms of the representation of women on
company boards between 1996 and 2010. As explained above, companies continue to
be followed in the sample even when they fall out of the FTSE350 but, for the sake of
clarity, Table 1 restricts companies to those contemporaneously in the FTSE350 at the
end of their financial year. The improvement in female representation over the period is
evident - more so for non-executives than for executives. Even at the end of the sample
period, however, only 3.25% of executives are female and only 9.81% of non-executive
directors are female. Descriptive statistics on the entire sample are available in Table
2.
2.2. Estimation
The process of adding new board members is modelled as a probit focusing on each
new appointment (this is not the periodic re-election of existing directors but the actual
appointment of a new person to the board). The dependent variable is the gender of
the newly selected person (1 = female). The independent variables comprise the range
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of company descriptors described above, including the measure of whether any male or
female has stepped down from the board in the prior 12-month period.4 It is possible
to have four things occur: no-one has stepped down; a male director has stepped down;
a female director has stepped down; both a male and a female director have stepped
down. All the independent variables are lagged one period. In what we label the Farrell
and Hersch (2005) test, the hypothesis tested is that with a gender neutral selection
process at work then the probability that a new appointment is female should bear no
significant relationship to the gender of those stepping down.
In the wage regressions, all three of our measures of pay are examined: the narrow
‘salary plus annual bonus’ type measure (‘TCC’); the wider measure of total direct
compensation that includes an estimate of the expected value of the share options
and performance shares granted in the period (‘TDCa’); and, finally, the total direct
compensation measure that records realised pay and avoids any ambiguity of valuation
(‘TDCr’). These three measures are only distinct in the case of the executive director
regressions. For non-executive directors, regression analysis is restricted to TCC owing
to the fact that their remuneration is essentially in the form of fees, as the use of
share options and other long term incentives is positively discouraged (being perceived
to threaten the independence of the director’s status). The dependent variable is in
logs. Independent variables include lagged values of company characteristics and the
personal attributes of the director concerned. Year dummies are included and estimation
is in fixed effects. The hypothesis being tested here is that, once in a job in the
boardroom, males and females are treated equally in terms of remuneration. Due to the
paucity of detail regarding the board appointment process, the issue of sample selection
(Heckman, 1979) is not explicitly treated. The interpretation of results below takes this
into account.
The performance of companies in relationship to the prevalence of women in board-
room positions is examined in a series of regressions using as dependent variable: total
shareholder return (‘TSR’); return of assets (‘ROA’); return of equity (‘ROE’); and the
logarithm of price to book ratio (‘LnPTOB’). The null hypothesis under test is that
there is a no significant link between a company’s performance and the prevalence of
women on the board of that company. In addition to the lagged percentage of directors
who are women, board size, proportion of directors who are non-executive, proportion
4Note that care relating to the timing of the departing director is required when coding this variable.
Here we use the actual date of appointment and look back 12 months for any exits by directors in that
company. This is more precise than simply structuring the data as a annual panel and using lagged
exit.
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who are judged independent, the size of the company and it’s volatility are all entered
with a lag as control variables. To reflect the dynamic nature of performance, the
lagged value of the dependent variable is also included. This variable is treated as en-
dogenous, being correlated with the error term. In addition, the lagged value ‘p female’
is also potentially endogenous. High performing companies may attract a greater pool
of female applicants and/or better performing companies may have more flexibility to
appoint female directors. Likewise, each of the control variables (‘LnSize’, ‘Board’,
p neds’, ‘p ind’ and ‘Volatility’) could be regarded as endogenous as a result of choices
made by the board, in view of expected performance. Because of this, estimation is by
generalised methods of moments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995;
Blundell and Bond, 1998). This exploits lagged values as instruments for the potentially
endogenous variables. The two step version of the estimator is used, with Windmeijer
(2005) corrected standard errors.
3. Results
Table 3 reports the probit estimates of the probability that a board appointment goes
to a woman. The first two columns treat all directorships alike. Even in column (2),
which controls for company characteristics, it can be seen that the fact that a woman
has stepped down in the previous period significantly enhances the probability that the
appointment in question will go to a woman. The reverse is true had a male recently
stepped down. Estimated at the median of the sample characteristics and reported
in Table 4, the probability of a female appointment changes from 0.075 if a man has
stepped down to 0.136 if a woman has stepped down. While these are empirically
modest probabilities (reflecting the dominant prevalence of male directors), the odds
against a female appointment fall by some 52% between the two scenarios.
Separating the analysis into executive directors (rows (3) and (4)) and non-executive
directors (rows (5) and (6)) reveals a markedly lower probability of women achieving
executive appointments as opposed to non-executive appointments. This was already
evident in Table 1 discussed above. The gender bias is statistically significant only in
the case of non-executive directors, where the probabilities of a female appointment
discussed above become 0.095 and 0.190 respectively. This represents a shift in the
odds against a female appointment from just under ten-to-one against to slightly over
four-to-one against. While representing an empirically significant impact on the odds of
appointment, these estimated probabilities are lower than the 0.13 and 0.39 respectively
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by Farrell and Hersch (2005) for the USA. However, the conclusion remains the same.
The non-executive appointment process is not gender neutral and there is evidence
of a degree of tokenism whereby boards have an eye to maintaining a representation
of women but do not allow an equal opportunity of appointment to all non-executive
positions.
The results on executive pay are presented in Table 5. The raw male-female wage gap
(the simple regressions reported in columns (1) through (3)) reveals that women are
paid at least 20% less than men in each of the three wage measures. Once company
characteristics, director personal characteristics and company-specific fixed effects are
controlled for, this wage gap becomes statistically insignificant (columns (4) through
(6)). A fixed effects estimator is used which conceptualises the unobserved firm-level
heterogeneity as time invariant and specific to each firm in our sample. It is easy
to imagine this fixed effect as the result of stable firm characteristics, at least over
the duration of our sample, such as geographical territory or culture. It is harder to
believe that this firm specific effect is randomly drawn from the population of firms
and unrelated to other company descriptors. Indeed, the random effects approach is
rejected by a Hausman test on our data. Of course, as Albrecht et al. (2003) are careful
to point out, the absence of a statistically significant gender gap with fixed effects does
not imply that there is no glass ceiling or that the executive labour market is free of
sex discrimination. For instance, omitting the CEO dummy from columns (4) to (6),
results in a weakly significant 9% pay gap,5 across the three measures of pay. This
implies at least some of the raw pay gap is the result of females finding themselves in
less senior positions. So there may be significant discrimination that impacts on women
on their career path to these positions but, once in post, the pay arrangements enjoyed
by female executive directors do not seem to be materially different from those enjoyed
by their male colleagues.
When the fees received by non-executive directors are considered in Table 6, a rather
different picture emerges. There is a clear gender difference in the raw levels of remuner-
ation received of just over 4% and this is statistically significant at the 10% confidence
level. But in a company-specific fixed effects regression that controls for company and
personal characteristics, a significant gap of over 8% is revealed, and this at a 1% level
of significance. After controlling for the day job of the non-executive director with
dummy variables indicating their executive role at any of the companies within sample,
5Output omitted here but available at
http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/working papers.htm
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this decreases to 7% but remains significant. It seems that the care being expended
by remuneration consultants on bench-marking and other pay design considerations for
executive director positions is not being effected as successfully for non-executives.
Finally, in Table 7, the association between gender diversity at board level and company
performance is examined. The focal variable is the fraction of the board that is female
(‘p female’) which is entered with a lag, as are the other variables that capture com-
pany characteristics.6 It can be seen that for each of shareholder return (‘TSR’), return
on assets (‘ROA’), return on equity (‘ROE’), and the price to book ratio (‘LnPTOB’)
there is no significant link between that performance measure and the extent of board-
room gender diversity (‘p female’). The evidence in Table 7, therefore, fails to support
the hypothesis that there is a productivity enhancing effect brought about by gender
diversity in the boardroom. Other than in the case of TSR, the estimates pass the
diagnostic tests for over-identifying restrictions and no serial correlation. Some caution
is necessary, therefore, in interpreting the TSR results.
Robustness checks on these estimates are performed,7 both by utilising the matching
approach of Abadie and Imbens (2011) and by a two stage least squares approach that
instruments the presence of women on a company’s board by utilising a measure of the
female connectedness of the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 8 These techniques al-
low more explicit treatment of endogeneity concerns at the price of a less direct measure
of female representation on the board. In neither case do the results of these checks
undermine our findings. The overall conclusion is, therefore, that there is no evidence
here of any boardroom gender diversity effect showing through to overall company per-
6As explained above, accounting-based performance measures are serially correlated and for this
reason the lag of the dependent variable is included in these GMM estimates.
7Not reported here but available for inspection, see
http://www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/working papers.htm
8The robustness equations are estimated with two-stage least squares (ivreg 2sls). The percentage of
female directors on the board is instrumented with ‘female connectedness’ on the board. We compute
‘female connectedness’ by calculating for each director-year, the number of female directors serving at
other companies where the director also served (typically as a non-executive director) in that year.
We sum ‘female connectedness’ for each firm-year and divide by the number of directors on the board
(so to eliminate an association with board size). Our instrument is valid under the assumption that
working relationships with female directors at other companies only impacts performance through the
association with the increased likelihood that females will be appointed to the company. This is a
similar identification strategy to that in Adams & Ferreira (2009). In the first stage, a one standard
deviation increase in the average number of female connections is associated with approximately a 2%
point increase in females on the board (p<0.000). At the mean percentage of females of just under
5%, this represents a 40% increase in relative terms. The instrument passes the standard diagnostic
tests that it is not a weak instrument (F=203.4 p<¡0.000; Min eigenvalue statistic=1210; Shea’s partial
r-squared = 0.08).
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formance.
4. Policy Discussion and Conclusions
Drawing on 15 years of data between 1996 and 2010 describing the boardroom compo-
sition, pay and performance of FTSE350 companies, this paper has addressed several
issues that emerge in the ongoing debate regarding the scarcity of women in the board-
room. This field is riven with contradictory findings (as we have attempted to review
above) and there is no settled view or agreement on the extent of the glass ceiling ef-
fect (lack of gender neutral appointment process), the existence of pay discrimination
towards female directors, or the impact of gender diversity on corporate performance.
In this context, two questions are addressed above. The first asks whether board-
room procedures are gender neutral by examining the process of making boardroom
appointments and by testing for a significant male-female pay gap. The second asks
whether a significant performance link can be observed between female representation
at boardroom level and company performance.
In terms of equity, the board appointment process is found to display a gender bias
in the case of non-executive directors. This is a gender bias in the sense that the
probability of a boardroom appointment going to a woman is dependent on whether a
woman has stepped down from the board in the recent period. The odds on making a
female appointment at the non-executive level (never high) are significantly enhanced
when a non-executive woman has stepped down in the prior period. The preponderance
of males on UK boards, of course, means that many more men stepping down than
women. The appointment process for non-executives is not gender neutral. In this
respect, our results are consistent with (Farrell and Hersch, 2005). No such significant
effect is found for executive positions, albeit the lower frequency of executive female
appointments may contribute to larger standard errors relative to the non-executive
appointments. Thus the absence of any evidence of gender bias in the executive process
is unlikely to provide much relief to policymakers striving to increase gender diversity,
given that the probability of a female executive appointment is already so much lower.
The result that the appointment process for non-executive directors tends to favour
replicating the gender of the departing director may be evidence of discrimination but
alternative interpretations exist. It may be that the proportion of female directors is
already optimal to start with. This would be consistent with the findings of Ahern
and Dittmar (2012) who show a significant negative effect on firm valuation subsequent
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to the mandatory appointment of female directors in Sweden - which in the light of
their finding could be interpreted as forcing firms to deviate from some sort of optimal
gender mix equilibrium. Equally, however, the result may owe more to a behavioural
effect known as the ‘status quo bias’ (Kahneman et al., 1991; Lau and Murnighan, 1998).
One explanation of this effect uses the framing model of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
to argue that in the face of uncertainty individuals weigh potential losses from a switch
more heavily than potential gains, and so end up preferring the status quo. Given the
policy importance of women on boards (Davies, 2011), it is clear that this is an area
ripe for further research.
Once appointed, however, executive directors are treated equally in terms of pay, both
in the narrower cash-based measure of ‘salary plus bonus’ and in the wider measures
that allow for equity-linked rewards such as executive share options and performance
shares. Given the extensive industry of remuneration consultants (Conyon, 2011) who
strive to devise appropriate pay arrangements, and given the transparency that char-
acterises disclosure in this area (Conyon et al., 2010), this result is perhaps less than
surprising. But, in the case of non-executive directors (where the median remuneration
is a relatively modest £42,420 as opposed to £411,165 for executives in the same TCC
cash pay terms), there is a significant male-female pay gap that is revealed once account
is taken of the personal and company characteristics. The estimated discriminatory gap
is around 7% to 8%. This is surprising and may relate to the tokenism of female non-
executive appointments which is suggested by the earlier result concerning the increased
likelihood of a woman being appointed if another woman has just stepped down from
the board. It may also reflect lighter monitoring of non-executive fees by institutional
shareholders relative to executive pay which attracts considerable scrutiny. Indeed,
hitherto, formal evidence on gender gaps in non-executive fees has been absent. It is
necessary to bear in mind the possibility of uncorrected sample selection bias (women
directors being of different quality than allowed for in our control variables) and further
research in this area is clearly desirable. But, given the increased emphasis assigned to
the role played by non-executive directors as a control mechanism for effective gover-
nance, institutional groups and policy makers may wish to reassess what actions can
be taken to ensure equality of treatment in the market for non-executive directors.
In terms of the second research question, there seems to be no significant link between
the gender diversity of boards and any of our measures of company performance. Of
course, a lack of clear connection with company performance is not to say that boards
with a more diverse make-up do not behave differently, as there is substantial evidence
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to suggest they do. But it does mean that there is no clear translation of this into perfor-
mance as measured on the bottom line, neither in terms of shareholder return (‘TSR’),
nor in terms of the accounting measures of ‘ROA’ and ‘ROE’, nor as measured by our
approximation to ‘Tobin’s-Q’. This is reminiscent of the (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) ar-
gument regarding ownership structure having no observed linkage with performance.
Boards may already be optimising their gender composition to take full advantage of
resource dependency considerations (Hillman et al., 2000; Luckerath-Rovers, 2009) or
concerns regarding advice and counsel (Westphal, 1999).
To be clear, the absence of a clear connection between gender diversity and company
performance does not undermine the case for greater levels of gender diversity in the
boardroom. The moral case that gender diversity is inherently valuable in and of itself
does not require justification by citing performance effects. Furthermore, the results
presented in Table 3 suggest the appointment process is not currently gender neutral
and that without external intervention substantially increased gender diversity in the
boardroom may be some time coming. Nevertheless, if proposals continue to be put
forwarded referring to clear performance benefits for UK companies then the case for
gender diversity may be undermined. Such proposals would be better structured around
the moral value of equal opportunity, rather than with reference to an expectation of
improved corporate performance.
Ian Gregory-Smith, University of Sheffield
Brian G. M. Main, University of Edinburgh
Charles A. O’Reilly III, Stanford University
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5. Tables
Table 1: Percentage of women on the board by year in the FTSE350
Percentage of Female Directors
Year N Board Size All Executives Non-execs
1996 350 9.72 2.22 0.65 3.36
1997 350 9.75 2.64 1.18 3.35
1998 350 9.88 3.28 1.39 4.52
1999 350 9.67 3.42 1.48 4.26
2000 350 9.71 4.05 2.01 4.99
2001 350 9.76 4.32 2.08 5.54
2002 350 9.70 5.06 2.76 6.25
2003 350 9.85 5.74 2.80 7.24
2004 350 9.93 6.45 2.69 8.33
2005 350 9.74 6.90 3.20 8.54
2006 350 9.70 7.18 3.49 8.70
2007 350 9.25 7.48 3.08 9.50
2008 350 8.99 7.33 3.19 8.93
2009 350 8.82 7.30 3.18 8.67
2010 350 8.62 8.19 3.24 9.82
* The FTSE350 is compiled by identifying the 350 companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) with the
highest market capitalisation as at their financial year end. Consequently, the composition of FTSE350 varies from
year to year.
† Data was not available for every company with years ending 2011, hence this year is omitted from the table above.
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Table 2: Sample Statistics
Variable N Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max
Executive.Years
Age 48,226 50.37 50.24 7.46 35.75 73.97
CEO 48,226 0.27 0 0.45 0 1
Chair 48,226 0.10 0 0.3 0 1
FD 48,226 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
LnTCC 48,226 12.58 12.61 0.89 8.35 14.31
LnTDCa 48,226 12.78 12.76 1.01 8.37 14.91
LnTDCr 48,226 12.69 12.67 0.99 8.35 14.83‘
RemCo Chair 48,226 0.01 0 0.08 0 1
RemCo Member 48,226 0.06 0 0.23 0 1
Tenure 48,226 5.64 3.81 5.63 0.08 27.23
Non-Executive.Years
Age 67,068 59.13 59.95 7.54 35.75 73.97
LnTCC 67,068 10.41 10.38 0.84 8.35 14.31
RemCo Chair 67,068 0.22 0 0.41 0 1
RemCo Member 67,068 0.73 1 0.44 0 1
Tenure 67,068 4.93 3.61 4.72 0.08 27.23
Company-Years Descriptives
Board 13,870 8.02 7 2.98 3 17
LnPTOB 13,870 0.51 0.44 0.94 -2.41 3.67
LnSize 13,870 11.5 11.62 2.46 4.66 16.83
p female 13,870 0.05 0 0.08 0 0.67
p ind 13,870 0.16 0.13 0.18 0 0.8
p neds 13,870 0.61 0.57 0.22 0 1
ROA 13,870 0.03 0.05 0.14 -0.79 0.32
ROE 13,870 0.05 0.09 0.4 -2.79 1.2
TSR 13,870 -0.01 0.07 0.54 -2.34 1.29
Volatility 13,870 0.14 0.12 0.09 0 0.56
* The sample comprises all executive and non-executive directors serving in companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange (with financial years ending between January 1995 and December 2011.
† All variables are winsorised at the 1% level.
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Table 3: The impact of gender on director appointments
All Appointments Executive Appointments Non-Executive Appointments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Recent Exit
FExit 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.23 0.22 0.56*** 0.46***
(9.30) (7.79) (1.60) (1.48) (9.03) (6.97)
MExit -0.024** -0.045*** -0.022 -0.019 -0.022 -0.063***
(-2.22) (-3.52) (-0.72) (-0.56) (-1.23) (-3.07)
Controls
ROAt−1 0.020 0.033 0.061
(0.12) (0.12) (0.29)
TSRt−1 0.063 0.14* 0.017
(1.56) (1.93) (0.35)
LnPTOBt−1 0.014 -0.054 0.045
(0.64) (-1.30) (1.61)
LnSizet−1 0.018 -0.060*** 0.038***
(1.60) (-2.79) (2.86)
Boardt−1 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.020**
(3.58) (3.22) (2.08)
p nedst−1 0.79*** 0.72*** 0.79***
(6.90) (2.73) (5.74)
p indt−1 -0.22* -0.47* -0.21
(-1.77) (-1.83) (-1.46)
V olatilityt−1 0.28 -0.23 0.45*
(1.33) (-0.57) (1.77)
Observations 9,023 8,968 3,563 3,531 5,469 5,437
z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* The table above reports probit estimates of the impact of recent female exit and recent male exit, on the probability
that the gender of a given appointment is female. The dependent variable is the population of director appointments,
with female appointments taking the value 1 and male appointments taking the value zero. Of the 9,023 director
appointments, 787 were female and 8,245 were male.
† Female (male) exit variables equal 1 if a female (male) director exited the company within the last 12 months from
the appointment date. The marginal effects of these variables are described in table 4.
‡ In the case of executive appointments (columns 3 and 4), the female (male) exit variables describe the exit of
an executive director in the last 12 months. In the case of non-executive appointments (columns 5 and 6) the exit
variables describe the exit of a non-executive director in the last 12 months. The marginal effects of these variables
are described in table 4.
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Table 4: Probabilities of the appointment being female implied by Table 3
Female Exit?
No Yes
All Appointments
No Male Exit 0.082 0.136***
Male Exit 0.075** 0.129***
Executive Appointments
No Male Exit 0.048 0.070
Male Exit 0.046 0.068
Non-Executive Appointments
No Male Exit 0.106 0.190***
Male Exit 0.095*** 0.179***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* The table describes the probability that a given appointment was female, by whether a female and/or male director
left the company in the last 12 months.
† The probability that the appointment is female is derived from the average marginal effects after the probit estimates
shown in Table 3. The average marginal effects were calculated for median values of each of the control variable.
‡ Stars indicate statistical significance relative to the case of no female exit and no male exit.
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Table 5: The gender pay gap: Executive directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.22*** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.042 -0.019 -0.038
(-4.12) (-3.23) (-3.89) (-1.26) (-0.56) (-1.04)
Individual Level Controls
CEO 0.54*** 0.58*** 0.54***
(52.9) (53.4) (50.2)
Chair 0.041* 0.0093 -0.0068
(1.94) (0.41) (-0.30)
FD 0.033*** 0.063*** 0.033***
(3.36) (6.22) (3.15)
Age 0.099*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(12.1) (12.5) (12.0)
Age2 -0.0010*** -0.0010*** -0.0010***
(-12.2) (-12.9) (-11.9)
Tenure 0.011*** 0.0075*** 0.015***
(10.2) (6.58) (12.4)
Firm Level Controls
ROAt−1 -0.034 -0.11* 0.053
(-0.68) (-1.87) (0.92)
TSRt−1 0.042*** 0.062*** 0.072***
(4.31) (5.23) (6.32)
LnPTOBt−1 -0.0022 -0.0087 0.051***
(-0.20) (-0.62) (3.80)
LnSizet−1 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.20***
(11.4) (12.4) (12.4)
Boardt−1 0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0030
(0.91) (-0.48) (-0.71)
p nedst−1 0.46*** 0.86*** 0.68***
(7.06) (9.68) (8.51)
p indt−1 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.27***
(4.41) (2.81) (4.12)
V olatilityt−1 0.11** 0.18*** 0.18***
(2.16) (2.83) (2.85)
Observations 48,226 48,226 48,226 45,822 45,822 45,822
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.572 0.602 0.571
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* The table above estimates the gender pay gap across three different measures of pay. ‘TCC’ the cash components
of remuneration received during the year, including salary, bonuses and perks. ‘TDCa’ adds to this measure the
expected value of share options and other equity awards granted during the year. ‘TDCr’ adds to TCC, the ex-post
realised value of share options and other equity awards exercised during the year. Each pay variable is defined in logs
and therefore female captures the gender pay gap in percentage terms.
† Columns 1, 2 and 3 describe the raw difference in pay between female and male executive directors. Columns 4, 5
and 6 describe the raw difference in pay fees arising from gender within companies.
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Table 6: The gender pay gap: Non-executive directors
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.042* -0.084*** -0.069***
(-1.95) (-5.77) (-4.68)
Individual Level Controls
Day Job CEO 0.077***
(5.22)
Day Job FD 0.038***
(2.71)
Day Job Chair 0.11***
(5.42)
Day Job Exec 0.049***
(3.82)
Chair 0.86*** 0.84***
(60.3) (59.1)
Rem Co Chair -0.0041 -0.0026
(-0.50) (-0.31)
Rem Co Member -0.017 -0.014
(-1.01) (-0.81)
Age 0.064*** 0.062***
(10.8) (10.5)
Age2 -0.0005*** -0.0005***
(-10.4) (-10.0)
Tenure 0.0034*** 0.0042***
(3.23) (3.94)
Firm Level Controls
ROAt−1 0.063 0.066
(1.44) (1.51)
TSRt−1 0.014* 0.015*
(1.81) (1.87)
LnPTOBt−1 0.019** 0.019**
(2.43) (2.36)
LnSizet−1 0.054*** 0.054***
(7.05) (7.01)
Boardt−1 0.0081*** 0.0083***
(3.22) (3.31)
p nedst−1 0.20*** 0.20***
(4.32) (4.18)
p indt−1 -0.17*** -0.17***
(-5.70) (-5.78)
V olatilityt−1 0.035 0.034
(0.79) (0.76)
Observations 67,068 64,045 64,045
R-squared 0.000 0.539 0.541
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* Col (1) describes the raw difference in fees between female and male non-executive directors.
† Col (2) describes the difference in fees , within companies and controlling for the role of the non-executive.
‡ Col (3) additionally controls for the day job of the non-executive director at another FTSE company within sample.
The base is no executive position.
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Table 7: The impact of gender diversity in the boardroom on corporate performance
TSR ROA ROE LnPTOB
p femalet−1 -0.079 0.024 0.13 0.059
(-1.21) (0.97) (1.40) (0.27)
Controls
yt−1 -0.13 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.72***
(-1.46) (4.37) (4.14) (16.8)
LnSizet−1 0.016*** 0.0090*** 0.024*** 0.019***
(3.95) (5.56) (5.83) (4.43)
Boardt−1 -0.0034 -0.0026*** -0.0046** 0.0070**
(-1.34) (-3.63) (-2.27) (2.44)
p nedst−1 0.14*** 0.016** 0.072*** -0.089*
(4.02) (2.05) (3.18) (-1.93)
p indt−1 0.050 -0.013 -0.050** -0.026
(1.58) (-1.63) (-2.23) (-0.75)
V olatilityt−1 -0.11 -0.052*** -0.13** 0.023
(-1.46) (-3.08) (-2.42) (0.29)
Hansen J 94.62*** 83.40 67.15 98.43
No AR(2) p=0.028 p=0.731 p=0.259 p=0.324
Observations 11,515 11,515 11,515 11,515
Number of companyid 1,983 1,983 1,983 1,983
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
* The table above estimates the impact of the percentage of female directors on the board, across four measures of
corporate performance. Total Shareholder Return (TSR) captures the annual change in the log of the Datastream
return index, capturing both capital growth in the company’s stock price and dividends. Return of Assets (ROA)
and Return on Equity (ROE) capture annual accounting performance. The natural log of the market to book ratio
proxies Tobin’s Q, a forward looking measure that indicates opportunities for future growth in the firm.
† The equations are estimated with GMM (xtabond2), treating the explanatory variables as endogenous covariates.
The two step version of the estimator is used, with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. The diagnostic
tests for valid overidentifying restrictions and no serial correlation in the AR(2) residuals pass other than in the case
of TSR.
‡ Alternative specifications were explored, including estimation by OLS, firm fixed effects (xtreg, fe),
matching techniques (psmatch2) and 2 stage least squares (ivregress 2sls). The absence of a positive
impact of females on corporate performance was robust to these alternative specifications (available at
www.homepages.ed.ac.uk/mainbg/working papers.htm).
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